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This paper seeks to gain insights into whether developing countries benefit more from the 
backwardness advantage for economic growth in the Information Age. The paper examines this 
concern through three complementary approaches. First, it derives theoretical grounds from the 
existing economic models to support the hypothesis that the internet, inter alia, enables 
developing countries to reap greater growth gains from technology acquisition and catch-up. 
Second, the paper uses descriptive evidence to show that the growth landscape has indeed 
shifted decisively in favor of developing countries in the Internet Age in comparison to the pre-
internet period. Third, using rigorous econometric techniques with data of 163 countries over a 
20-year period, 1996-2016, the paper evidences that developing countries on average reap 
significantly greater growth gains from internet adoption in comparison to the average 
advanced country. The paper discusses policy implications from the paper’s findings. 
 
Keywords: backwardness advantage; developing countries; internet; technology catch-up; GMM. 
JEL: O40  
Acknowledgement  
This paper is supported by the NUS Staff Research Support grant. The authors deeply 







Gerschenkron (1962) coined the term “backwardness” advantage, with which he argues that 
developing countries have an advantage over developed nations because they can quickly and 
less riskily adopt technologies, methods of production, and management techniques that have 
been developed in advanced countries. Furthermore, the more distant a country is from the 
world’s technology frontiers, the greater the potential benefits it can reap from this advantage. 
Although the backwardness advantage is a powerful economic concept that has been 
theoretically explained by influential studies1, empirical evidence supporting it remains scant. A 
possible reason for this deficient support is the lack of adequate data for conducting rigorous 
investigations to examine this hypothesis. 
The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) revolution, especially the rapid 
penetration of the internet and mobile technologies across nations and sectors since the 1990s, 
has enabled countries and firms to considerably enhance their connectivity with the world, 
accessibility to global knowledge, and learning capabilities, which have potentials effects on 
global economic growth (Jorgenson and Vu, 2005, 2016).For developing countries, this progress 
has indeed been a paradigm shift. This leapfrog change enables developing countries to 
overcome the critical, previously unsurmountable problems thathave hindered most 
developing countries from exploiting their backwardness advantage. These problems range 
from shortages of information and poverty of knowledge to disconnection with advanced 
countries and the prohibitive costs of communication (Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon, 
2019). 
The rapid penetration of the internet and mobile technology, to a certain extent, provides 
valuable insights into the dynamism of developing countries in embracing the ICT revolution to 
overcome the problems that have hampered them from exploiting their backwardness 
advantage. However, empirical studies to examine the growth effects of this paradigm shift on 
developing countries remain limited, probably due to two possible reasons. First, the main 
                                                          
1 For example, see Nelson and Phelps (1966), Krugman(1979), and Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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objective of most studies is to detect the overall effect of ICT on growth across nations,2without 
looking deeper into whether the effect is stronger for developing countries. Second, a few 
studies that inspect this issue do not reveal significant evidence of the greater growth gains that 
developing countries are expected to reap from ICT adoption. For example, Niebel (2018), who 
investigates whether the gains from investments in ICT differ between three groups of 
economies3, developing, emerging, and developed, does not detect any statistically significant 
differences among them in the growth effect of ICT. With this finding, the author calls into 
question the expectation that developing countries are ‘leapfrogging’ through ICT. This view is 
supported by Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013), who find that 
productivity gains from investments in ICT assets are significant in both developed and 
developing countries but that these gains are not different between the two groups. It follows 
that the research aims to assess the whether the findings of Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) 
and Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel (2018) withstand empirical scrutiny, using more countries 
and updated data.  
Moreover, the earlier studies that use data from the initial stage of the ICT revolution are even 
more skeptical about the growth effects of ICT in developing countries. For example, Bell and 
Pavitt (1993), Dewan and Kraemer (2000), Pohjola (2001), Lee et al. (2005), and Park et al. 
(2007) find that the ICT-growth link is positive and significant only for developed countries. 
According to these authors, undeveloped human capital and poor telecommunications 
infrastructure are likely the main factors that hinder developing countries from reaping ICT-
enabled growth effects. 
As the ICT revolution, particularly the internet has rapidly penetrated across nations and 
reached substantial rates of penetration even in low-income ones, developing countries have 
undertaken leapfrog improvements in their accessibility to frontier knowledge and learning 
capabilities. As a result, it is plausible that ICT penetration, for which internet adoption is a key 
                                                          
2For example, see which are mostly focus on developed countries inter alia, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner 
and Sichel (2002), Inklaar, O’Mahony, and Timmer (2005), Inklaar, Van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 
(2008). For a recent comprehensive survey of literature on the growth effect of ICT see Vu, Hanafizadeh, and 
Bohlin (2020). 
3The study, examining a sample of 59 countries for the period 1995–2010, finds a strong link between ICT 
penetration and growth for the overall sample.  
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indicator, has a significant effect on growth in developing countries, especially through 
enhancing their capabilities to exploit the backwardness advantage. Indeed, some previous 
studies have found significant evidence on the internet-growth link at the firm level. For 
example, Paunov and Rollo (2016), investigating the firm-level data from 117 countries over 
2006-2011, show that firms with adequate absorptive capabilities reap significant productivity 
gains from Internet-enabled knowledge access. Similarly, Fernandes et al. (2019), examining 
China’s firm-level data for 1999-2017, find that the Internet not only boosts trade, but also 
enhances overall firm performance.    
The main research question addressed by this paper is whether internet adoption has enabled 
developing countries to more effectively exploit the backwardness advantage to achieve higher 
economic growth. The underlying research question is consistent with the stated aim of 
assessing whether the findings of Niebel (2018) as well as of Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) 
and Dedrick et al. (2013) have contemporary relevance when more countries and 
contemporary data are taken on board. It is important to note that according to Niebel (2018): 
“The regressions for the subsamples of developing, emerging and developed countries do not 
reveal statistically significant differences in the output elasticity of ICT between these three 
groups of countries. Thus, the results indicate that developing and emerging countries are not 
gaining more from investments in ICT than developed economies, calling into question the 
argument that these countries are ‘leapfrogging’ through ICT” (p. 197).  
Revisiting Niebel (2018) in a different context is both relevant to scholars and policy makers for 
at least two reasons. On the scholarly front, as more data become available in time (i.e. recent 
years) and space (i.e. more countries), it is worthwhile for researchers to assess if the findings 
of studies based on less contemporary frameworks withstand empirical scrutiny. Doing so helps 
in confirming and refuting tendencies in contributions to knowledge which can change across 
time. Second, it is important for policy makers to be aware of factors that facilitate the 
economic development catch-up process because these factors are, inter alia, taken into 
account in decision making processes surrounding national and international measures of 
reducing cross-country disparities in economic development across the world. Hence, given the 
potential of ICT penetration in developing countries on the one hand and the findings of Niebel 
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(2018) which question whether developing countries are “leapfrogging” through ICT  on the 
other hand, it is relevant to provide policy makers with another perspective based on recent 
data and more countries including also the least developed ones. The empirical study, therefore, 
will focus on detecting whether developing countries can reap a greater growth gain from 
internet adoption in comparison to developed nations. In contrast to previous studies by 
Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007), Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel (2018) which rely on samples 
consisting of a total of less than 60 countries with data updated only to 2010, this paper 
examines an exhaustive sample of 163 countries with a time span of data updated to 2016.  
It is worthwhile to articulate that the focus of this research also steers clear of the extant 
contemporary technological forecasting and technological spillovers literature, which has 
largely been oriented towards, inter alia: issues surrounding business prospects’ forecasting 
(Amankwah-Amoah, Osabutey and Egbetokun, 2018); the effect of technological externalities 
on small and medium size enterprises (Del Giudice, Scuotto, Garcia-Perez and Petruzzelli, 2019); 
the relevance of inter-sectoral spillovers in knowledge pertaining to innovations that are 
technology-oriented (Stephan, Bening, Schmidt, Schwarz and Hoffmann, 2019); technologies in 
learning and diffusion of knowledge within global and local spheres (Zhang, Bauer, Yin and Xie, 
2020); the importance of spillovers in knowledge in the production of sustainable energy 
(Miremadi, Saboohi and Arasti, 2019); spillovers from technology in patent and trade markets 
(Cai, Sarpong, Tangand Zhao, 2020) and improving information technology for sustainable and 
inclusive (Asongu and le Roux, 2017) development outcomes. The positioning of the current 
research is closest to the last strand of the attendant studies because the focus of the research 
is on how information technology can enable cross-country catch-up in economic development. 
Accordingly, in the light of theoretical underpinnings surrounding catch-up in an outcome 
variable, such catch-up is only feasible when there are cross-country disparities in factors (i.e. 
contained in the conditioning information set) that are exogenous to the outcome variable  
(Narayan, Mishra & Narayan, 2011). It follows that the rate at which technology is increasing in 
sampled countries determines cross-country catch-up tendencies, which is consistency with the 




The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2presents theoretical grounds 
derived from existing economic models that support the hypothesis that internet adoption, 
inter alia (i.e. other adopted elements in the conditioning information set),enables developing 
countries to reap greater growth gains by enhancing their backwardness advantage. Section 3 
demonstrates the descriptive evidence that developing countries over the past two decades, on 
average, significantly improved their economic performance in comparison to developed 
nations. In Sections 4 and 5, rigorous empirical estimations are conducted to test the 
hypothesis using the data of 163 countries over the period from 1996 to 2016. Section 4 
presents the econometric specification, data, and estimation techniques. The examination aims 
to address, to the extent possible, the potential problems of omitted variable bias and 
simultaneity, emphasizing the control of country-fixed effects and employing the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) approach. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The internet as a stimulator of growth: Some theoretical grounds 
This section relies on existing economic models to derive the theoretical grounds that support 
the hypothesis that internet adoption enables developing countries to reap greater growth 
gains by exploiting their backwardness advantage. The three models to be examined include 
“technological catch-up”, “leader-follower”, and “appropriate technology”, which provide 
consistent and complementary views of the power of knowledge acquisition in economic catch-
up. 
 
2.1. The technological catch-up model 
Rogers (2004: 578) presents a simple model of technological catch-up introduced by Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) that can help shed light on the effect of internet penetration on growth. The 
model describes the growth of technology in a country as follows: 
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?̇?(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) = 𝜑(. ) [𝑇 − 𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) ] = 𝜑(. ) {[𝑇 𝐴(𝑡)]⁄ − 1}                                                      (1) 
where 𝐴(𝑡)is the country’s technology level at time 𝑡 and?̇?(𝑡) 𝐴(𝑡)⁄ is its growth rate, 𝑇 is the 
world practice technology, and 𝜑is a function representing absorptive capability. 
The model, as such, indicates that the growth rate of technology in a country𝑔𝐴 = ?̇?(𝑡) 𝐴(𝑡)⁄  is 
determined by two characteristics: its absorptive capability𝜑 and the technology gap between 
it and the world frontier{[𝑇 𝐴(𝑡)]⁄ − 1}. 
This model supports the backwardness advantage thesis stated by Gerschenkron (1962) and in 
more contemporary literature on technology spillovers to developing countries (Stephan et al., 
2019; Zhang et al., 2020). According to the thesis, developing countries have an advantage over 
advanced nations because they can adopt technologies and management methods that have 
been developed in advanced nations. 
Regarding the absorptive capability 𝜑, Rogers (2004) articulates three major elements. The first 
is accessibility to overseas technology, which takes into account the country’s business, 
educational, and social linkages with international markets, suppliers, and investors. The 
second element is learning ability, which particularly emphasizes the ability to understand, 
communicate, and internalize a new technology. The final element is related to the macro 
factors that encourage or hinder the adoption of new technologies, which range from 
government incentives to entrepreneurship, from sociopolitical stability to business 
environment. 
Eq (1) indicates that a lower𝐴(𝑡), which means a lower𝐴(𝑡)/𝑇 ratio, implies a greater 𝑔𝐴, 
controlling for 𝜑(. ). That is, if a country is further away from the world technology frontier, it 
has a greater potential to grow faster by narrowing its technological gap, while sustaining or 
improving its absorptive capabilities. The paragraphs below will explain why the internet 




Solving the differential equation described in Eq (1) yields a family of solutions, including the 
following4: 𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑇 − 𝜃𝑒−𝜑𝑡                                                            (2) 
where 𝜃 (0 < 𝜃 < 𝑇) is a constant. 
It is easy to verify that the solution specified in Eq (2) is a valid solution of the differential 
equation expressed in Eq (1) and that 0 < 𝐴(𝑡) < 𝑇. 
Two insights can be drawn from Eq (2). First, 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝜑⁄ = 𝜃𝑡. 𝑒−𝜑𝑡 > 0, which means that 
enhancing a country’s absorptive capability 𝜑 will increase its technology level 𝐴. Second, 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝑇⁄ = 1 > 0, which means that expanding the world’s available technology stock has a 
positive effect on 𝐴. These insights suggest that the internet can elevate the technology level 𝐴 
through two channels. On the one hand, it enhances the country’s absorptive capability  𝜑, 
which includes access to foreign technology, the learning ability of businesses, and the set of 
factors influencing the firm-level adoption of technology. On the other hand, it expands the 
stock of world technologies 𝑇 that the country can practically find and acquire. It is plausible to 
conjecture that the effect of internet penetration on ∆𝑇/𝑇is larger for a typical developing 
country than for a typical developed nation because, without the internet, the former suffers 
from more severe problems related to access to information, connectivity, and communication. 
As pointed out by Haussmann and Rodrik (2003), the neoclassical model’s assumption that the 
knowledge of all extant goods is common and accessible by all countries is not plausible. 
Furthermore, the authors echo Nelson (2000), Evenson and Westphal (1995), and Lall (2000) 
when saying that much of this knowledge is ‘‘tacit’’, which means that it requires intensive 
communication and robust exchanges to become imitable.  
At the same time, the effects of internet use on the absorptive capability 𝜑of a typical 
developing country are likely substantial in accordance with the three major elements specified 
by Roger, which include the accessibility to global knowledge, the learning ability of businesses 
and workers, and an enabling environment for technology adoption as presented above. 
                                                          
4To simplify the exposition, we assume that 𝜑 and 𝑇 do not depend on 𝑡. Considering 𝜑 as 𝑇 functions of 𝑡 results 
in a more complex solution but yields the same insights. 
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The discussion above suggests that internet adoption enables developing countries to enhance 
their capabilities to exploit their backwardness advantage. This internet-enhanced catch-up 
effect, therefore, is expected to enable developing countries to grow faster than developed 
ones during the Information Age, all else being equal. 
 
2.2. The leader-follower model 
Kuznets (1966) argues that increasing the “transnational stock of knowledge” facilitates 
economic growth in each nation because “no matter where these innovations emerge… the 
economic growth of any given nation depends upon their adoption,” (p. 286).  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapters 6, 8; 1997) present a model that can help explain how 
innovation and technology imitation affect the rate of economic growth. In this model, the 
growth of the leader economy (economy 1) is driven by its innovations, while the growth of the 
follower economy (economy 2) depends on its imitation of the innovations that have been 
made in the leader economy. From the model developed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 
268-273), the growth rate 𝛾1 of the leader economy can be expressed as follows: 
𝛾1 = (1 𝜃⁄ ). [(𝐿1 𝜂⁄ ). (1 − 𝛼𝛼 ) . (𝐴1)1 (1−𝛼)⁄ 𝛼2 (1−𝛼)⁄ − 𝜌]                                                            (3) 
where 𝜃 > 0 and 𝜌 > 0are parameters related to the utility function of households;0 < 𝛼 <1is the elasticity of the marginal product of intermediate goods in the production function (the 
model assumes that the parameters 𝜃, 𝜌, and 𝛼 are similar for the two economies);𝐴1 >0represents the productivity level of country 1, which is determined by its level of technology 
and quality of governance;𝐿1is the labor endowment; and 𝜂 is the unit cost of inventing a new 
variety of intermediate goods.  
At the same time, the growth rate 𝛾2of the follower economy can be expressed in an equation 
similar to Eq (3). Furthermore, the growth rate 𝛾2 of the follower economy can be linked to the 
growth rate 𝛾1 of the leader economy as follows (p. 273)  
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𝛾2 ≈ 𝛾1 − 𝜇. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑁2 𝑁1⁄(𝑁2 𝑁1⁄ )∗]                                                               (4) 
where 𝜇 > 0 is a positive parameter that determines the speed of convergence,𝑁1 is the 
number of varieties of intermediate products that have been discovered in the leader 
economy,𝑁2(< 𝑁1) is the number of varieties that the follower economy has adopted, and 0 <(𝑁2 𝑁1⁄ )∗ ≤ 1 is the ratio when the two countries have reached their steady states, in 
which𝑁2 𝑁1⁄ = (𝑁2 𝑁1⁄ )∗ and hence 𝛾2 = 𝛾1 . 
This model can be slightly modified to explain how internet adoption can boost economic 
growth in both leader and follower economies. In their model, Barro and Sala-i-Martin assume 
that the follower has good knowledge of all 𝑁1 varieties of intermediate products that have 
been discovered in the leader economy. However, this is not the case in the real world, in which 
businesses in the follower economy have limited access to information and a limited capability 
to communicate with foreign suppliers to understand which varieties have been viable in the 
leader economy. Therefore, the actual number of varieties introduced in the leader economy 
that businesses in the follower economy can practically find to explore imitation possibilities 
is𝑁1𝐴, which is smaller than𝑁1.  
Applying the leader-follower model to the real world, it is plausible to assume that a typical 
developed country represents the leader economy, while a typical developing country 
embodies the follower economy pattern. As such, the internet has a positive effect on growth 
in developed and developing countries, as follows. 
 
Developed countries 
The internet positively affects the growth rate 𝛾1expressed in Eq (3) for a typical developed 
countryas follows: 
 Reducing the cost of invention 𝜔  through internet-enabled operational improvements, 
including better access to global knowledge, lower costs of learning, more effective 
communication and coordination.  
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 Enlarging the labor endowment 𝐿1, which is the product of the total labor force and its 
average level of knowledge (𝑒1). By making knowledge more readily accessible to ordinary 
people and facilitating their learning, the internet raises 𝑒1. In addition, the internet also helps 
enlarge the labor force by enabling people to work part-time, anywhere, and anytime. 
 Elevating the level of productivity 𝐴1. The internet makes this elevation possible by enhancing 
transparency and fostering learning, knowledge sharing, performance benchmarking, and 
adoption of best practices, which strengthen the country’s technology competence and the 
governance quality.  
 
Developing countries 
The internet’s positive effects on growth in developing countries can be seen from two angles. 
On the one hand, it boosts their imitation activities. Similar to what was presented above for 
innovation activities in developed countries; the internet fosters technology acquisition in 
developing countries through three transmission channels:5 lowering the cost of imitation𝜐; 
raising the labor endowment𝐿2; and elevating the level of technology𝐴2. On the other hand, it 
enhances the developing countries’ backwardness advantage, as shown in Eq (5) below. Note 
that Eq (5) is modified from Eq (4) by replacing theoretical 𝑁2 𝑁1⁄  with actual 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ . 𝛾2 ≈ 𝛾1 + {−𝜇. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄(𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ )∗]}                                                               (5) 
 
As implied by Eq (5), the internet can accelerate 𝛾2 through two channels: boosting growth in 
the leader economy(𝛾1) and enlarging 𝑁1𝐴– the actual number of varieties introduced in the 
leader economy that firms in the follower economy can find to study for imitation. Note that 
the ratio 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ is always below its steady stage level (𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ )∗, which means that the second 
                                                          
5 The growth rate of the follower country is expressed as (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995: 270): 𝛾2 = (1 𝜃⁄ ). [(𝐿2 𝜐⁄ ). (1−𝛼𝛼 ) . (𝐴2)1 (1−𝛼)⁄ 𝛼2 (1−𝛼)⁄ − 𝜌]. 
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term of Eq (5), {−𝜇. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄(𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ )∗]} takes a positive value. Enlarging 𝑁1𝐴 therefore increases the 
absolute value of 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄(𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ )∗] and, hence,raises 𝛾2.6 
 
2.3. The appropriate technology model 
Basu and Weil (1998) present a model of growth and technology transfer, which implies that 
technology improvements will diffuse slowly, even if there are no barriers to knowledge 
transfer and no adoption costs. This model and underlying intuition, as apparent in the 
contemporary information technology for economic growth literature (Abor, Amidu and 
Issahaku, 2018; Miremadi et al., 2019; Cai et al., 2020), can also be used to provide theoretical 
grounds for supporting the hypothesis that the internet is a stimulator of growth and that its 
effect tends to be greater for developing countries. As modeled by the authors (p.8), the 
relationship between the growth rate 𝑔 of a country and its technology level𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡)isas follows: 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) = (1 − 𝑒−𝛽𝛾 𝑔⁄ ). 𝐴∗(𝑘)                                                                                 (6) 
where 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾 > 0 are the model’s parameters, and𝐴∗(𝑘) is the technology level at the 
steady state. 
From Eq (6), the economic growth 𝑔 can be expressed as 
𝑔 = 𝛽𝛾−ln [1 − 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) 𝐴∗(𝑘)⁄ ]                                                                      (7) 
Note that 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) 𝐴∗(𝑘)⁄  takes a value between 0 and 1, the denominator in Eq (7) {−ln [1 − 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) 𝐴∗(𝑘)⁄ ]} is positive and its magnitude decreases as the technology ratio 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) 𝐴∗(𝑘)⁄ declines. It is plausible that internet penetration enhances both the country’s 
accessibility to global knowledge and its absorptive capability, which would raise the steady-
state technology level 𝐴∗(𝑘). This enhancement tends to be larger for a developing country 
                                                          
6 To illustrate, consider the following simple hypothetical example: 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ =0.4; (𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄ )∗=0.8; 𝜇=2.5%; and the 
internet helps enlarge 𝑁1𝐴 such that the current 𝑁2 𝑁1𝐴⁄  declines from 0.5 to 0.3. This effect is translated into a 
growth gain of -2.5%*[ln(0.3/0.8) - [ln(0.5/0.8)] = +1.3%. 
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than for a developed nation. Along the same lines, Eq (7) indicates that internet adoption 
fosters economic growth, and this acceleration is stronger for developing countries than for 
developed ones.7 
Besides, some other important studies also suggest valuable insights into this analysis. 
Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007) show that reliance on technology 
acquisition may no longer be the best strategy for developing countries as they approach closer 
to the world technology frontier. At the same time, Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav 
(2004) demonstrate that while growth in a country depends more heavily on capital 
accumulation in its early stage of development, it will be more driven by human capital 
accumulation in a later stage. That is, the effect of internet adoption on growth in developing 
countries is likely stronger for less developed countries through fostering capital accumulation 
and for more developed countries through human capital accumulation. 
Overall, all three theoretical models presented in this section support the hypothesis that 
developing countries have the potential to achieve greater growth gains from Internet adoption. 
Sections 3-5 that follow will test this hypothesis with different approaches. While Section 3 
conducts only a simple reality check, Sections 4 and 5 employ rigorous econometric techniques 
to tease out empirical evidence. 
 
3. The backwardness advantage as a booster of economic growth in the information age: a 
reality check 
The 20-year period from 1996 to 2016, which witnessed the rapid penetration of the internet 
across nations8can be used to conduct a quick reality check to see whether there was a notable 
                                                          
7As an illustrative example, assume that𝐴(𝑘, 𝑡) 𝐴∗(𝑘)⁄  declines from 0.6 to 0.5, and the denominator in Eq (7) 
decreases from {-ln(1-0.6)}= 0.92 to {-ln(1-0.5)}=0.69. As a result, the growth rate 𝑔 will accelerate from 𝛽𝛾/0.92 =1.09 𝛽𝛾 to 1.44 𝛽𝛾. Note that 𝛽𝛾 > 0. 
8 In fact, median internet penetration of the developing countries soared by more than 600 times, from 0.07% in 
1996 to 46.3% in 2016. This pattern was observed for most large economies. For example, China (4,066 times, 
from 0.013% to 53.2%), India (638 times, from 0.046% to 29.5%), Indonesia (450 times, from 0.057% to 25.5%), 
Mexico (297 times, from 0.20% to 59.5%), Brazil (135 times, from 0.45% to 60.9%), and Vietnam (350,000 times, 
from 0.000% to 46.5%). For comparisons, median internet penetration of the developed countries rose by about 
20 times, from 4.5% in 1996 to 88.4% in 2016 (Data source: WDI, 2019). 
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growth acceleration pattern in this period and how developing countries performed in 
comparison to developed ones. It should be noted that growth acceleration during this period,if 
observed, would be driven by many factors other than internet use. These factors can range 
from the accelerated pace of globalization and human capital development to technology 
progress and new waves of market-oriented policy reforms in emerging economies. Although 
one should not attribute this growth acceleration solely to internet use, the internet has 
undoubtedly had a positive effect on all these factors. At the same time, there are emerging 
factors that could cause growth slowdown in developed countries, which include the steady 
state, population ageing, and competition from emerging economies. That is, the growth 
acceleration, on average, is expected to be greater for developing countries than for developed 
ones.  
For benchmarks, our reality check compares the economic performance between the invested 
period of 1996-2016 and its previous equivalent period (1976-1996). To make comparisons 
meaningful, the exercise is focused on a subsample of 115 countries for which data is available 
for both the 1976-1996 and 1996-2016 periods. These 115 countries can be divided into two 
groups – “developing” (93 developing countries) and “developed” (22 developed economies).9 
 
Our reality check exercise examines whether the reality supports the following three 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis #1: Economic growth rates of developing countries, on average and in distributions, 
significantly improved from 1976-1996 to 1996-2016.  
Hypothesis #2: The growth acceleration from 1976-1996 to 1996-2016 is more notable for the 
developing group than for the developed one. 
                                                          
9 We use the classification developed countries defined by UN (1990), which was established before the 
emergence of the internet. 
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Hypothesis #3: The growth landscape for the developing group vis-a-vis the developed group 
looks more encouraging in 1996-2016 (the internet period)than in 1976-1996 (the non-internet 
period). 
It is relevant to note that while the third testable hypothesis underpins the importance of 
internet in explaining cross-country differences in economic growth during the period 1996-
2006, the modeling is such that the internet is not exclusively responsible for cross-country 
differences in economic growth. This is essentially because, in a real world, economic growth is 
not exclusively contingent on internet penetration, but as well depends on other 
macroeconomic factors that should be taken on board. Hence, the modeling approach adopted 
in this study that incorporates this reality is the conditional convergence approach within the 
framework of conditional convergence GMM modeling. While in unconditional convergence 
modeling, only the lagged dependent variable is used as the independent variable of interest, in 
conditional convergence modeling, other elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. 
control variables) are involved in the regression exercise, such that cross-country changes in the 
outcome variable are contingent on cross-country changes in all elements in the conditioning 
information set.It follows that the assessment of Hypothesis 3 in the empirical analysis will 
consists of establishing that, internet penetration is a significant contributor to cross-country 
differences in economic growth.10 
 
The results from Table 1 show that the average GDP per capita growth rate of the developing 
group accelerated by 1.3% points, from 0.7% in 1976-1996 to 2.0% in 1996-2016, while its 
standard deviation narrowed by 1.1% points, from 2.9% to 1.8%. At the same time, the average 
growth rate of the developed group decelerated by 0.6% points, from 2.0% to 1.4%, while its 
standard deviation was unchanged at 0.7% but its (Min—Max) range widened, from (0.8%--
                                                          
10The intuition is sound and consistent with theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, the intuition of convergence is 
that cross-country catch-up in the outcome variable is possible if sampled countries exhibit cross-country 
differences in the elements of the conditioning information set (Asongu and Nwachuwku, 2016). Hence, in the light 
of this definition of conditional catch-up, if the sampled countries differ in terms of internet penetration and other 
control variables, then catch-up is theoretically possible. This should practically be expected because while internet 
penetration has reached saturation levels in developed countries, developing countries are still characterized by 
some high penetration potential 
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3.8%) to (0.2%--4.1%). These findings support Hypothesis #1 and Hypothesis #2. In addition, the 
contrasting patterns observed for the developing and developed groups on growth variation, 
which is narrowing for developing countries and widening for developed ones, is worth noting. 
This pattern suggests that, while the internet has improved the level playing field for 
developing countries to exploit their backwardness advantage, it has enlarged the divergence in 





Table 1: Average GDP per capita growth rate by group: 1996-2016 vs. 1976-1996  
Group N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Developing countries 
1976-1996 (a1) 93 0.7% 2.9% -12.7% 8.1% 
1996-2016 (a2) 93 2.0% 1.8% -2.0% 8.5% 
Change (a2-a1) 0 1.3% -1.1% 10.7% 0.4% 
Developed countries 
1976-1996 (b1) 22 2.0% 0.7% 0.8% 3.8% 
1996-2016 (b2) 22 1.4% 0.7% 0.2% 4.1% 
Change (b2-b1) 0 -0.6% 0.0% -0.6% 0.3% 
Source: authors’ calculation with data from WDI (2019) 
Figure 1 provides further evidence supporting Hypothesis #1 and Hypothesis #2. In fact, the 
distribution of 20-year GDP per capita growth rates shifted decisively to the right from 1976-
1996 to 1996-2016for the group of developing countries (Panel A), while it shifted to the left for 
the developed group (Panel B).  
Figure 1 also provides evidence supporting Hypothesis #3. As shown in Panel B, the developing 
group was ahead of the developed group on the distribution of growth rates for the internet 
period (1996-2016), while the developing group was behind in the previous period (1976-1996). 
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Figure 1: Distribution of 20-year GDPC growth rate  
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4. Empirical specification and estimation techniques 
4.1. Empirical specification 
The empirical specification employs a dynamic panel data approach,11which takes the following 
form: 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 ∗𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡′𝐵 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (8) 
where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 indicate country 𝑖 in year 𝑡, respectively; 𝜇𝑖represents country-specific 
characteristics;𝜗𝑡represents time-fixed effects; and𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the random error term. The variables 
are defined below. 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡  is annual real GDP per capita growth and its lag,𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1,is included to capture 
the unobserved factors that underlie the persistent pattern of the dependent 
variable.𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡−1isthe initial level of per capita income, which is measured as the logarithm 
of GDP per capita measured in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars; This variable is 
important for controlling the convergence effect specified by Barro (1991, 1997) and Barro and 
Sa-la-i-Martin (1995). 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1is the logarithm value of the level of internet penetration at the beginning of each 
period, which is measured as the number of internet users per 100 population.12Note that the 
internet penetration is more meaningful than the broadband penetration for two main reasons. 
First, the former better captures the efforts of a nation in embracing the ICT revolution for 
learning, while the latter is, to certain extent, biased toward the infrastructure condition. 
Second, the data coverage of internet penetration is far more complete than that of broadband 
penetration in both the number of countries and the time span. 
 
                                                          
11 Islam (1995); Temple (1999); among many growth studies using this approach are Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2009), 
Forbes (2000), Eicher and Schreiber (2010), and d’Agostino et al. (2016). 




𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the country belongs to the group of 
countries defined as “backward” and 0 otherwise (see Appendix1 for details). Note that the 
dummy variable backward does not stand alone in Eq (8), because the inclusion of country-
fixed effect 𝜇𝑖  causes its drop. The paper uses alternative classifications of countries as 
backward to examine whether these groups of countries can reap great growth gains from 
internet adoption. The interaction term 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 is used to capture this 
enhanced effect. The effect of internet adoption on growth in the average developing economy, 
therefore, is (𝛽3 + 𝛽4), of which 𝛽3is the effect for the average developed country and 𝛽4is the 
enhanced effect. The inclusion of the interaction term𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖allows the 
model to achieve two apparently conflicting objectives at the same time. On the one hand, it 
makes it possible to control for fixed effects to reduce the omitted variable bias caused by the 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the country-fixed effect. On the other hand, 
it retains the valuable information associated with country heterogeneity (Temple, 1999), 
which may be the key source of persistent economic performance disparities among countries 
(Durlauf and Quah, 1998; Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005). 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡′  is a vector of the control variables that has potential links with growth, which 
include 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 , 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 , and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 . The 
variable𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 represents the institutional quality, for which we use as a proxy the rule of 
law index derived from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset.13Previous studies have 
found significant evidence of the positive effect of institution quality on growth (for example, 
Barro, 1991; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004; Hart, 1997; Eicher et al. 2006; Vu, 2011), 
suggesting that the coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛should take a positive sign. 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 captures the intensity of capital investment in the economy, which is defined 
asthe gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. This variable is expected to take a 
                                                          
13 This index is defined as the “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence.” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2006). The annual data from the WGI 
dataset are available from 1996 onwards, with the exception of 1998 and 2000. The data for each of these two 
years are assumed to be the mid-point of the values observed for its previous and following years.  
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positive sign, as evidenced by previous studies such as Barro (1997) and Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil(1992). 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  captures the tax burden on the economy, which is proxied by final government 
consumption as a percentage of GDP, while𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the annual inflation rate, which 
captures macroeconomic instability. It is expected that the coefficients of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡and 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 will be negative (King and Rebelo, 1990; Hansson and Henrekson, 1994; Barro, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
The variable 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟can be used to provide a quick assessment of the effect of time trends on 
economic growth. While the time-fixed effects control for the effect specific to each year such 
as economic/financial crisis, disruptive technological progress, and conflict eruptions, the time 
trend variable captures the possible time effect that is constant for each year. It is likely that 
the rapid progress of technology and globalization along with the rise of two giant markets – 
China and India, would give the time trends some positive effect. It should be noted that the 
time trend is included only in the regressions that do not control for time-fixed effects. 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the key variables in Eq (8). The empirical estimations are 











Growth GDP per capita growth 3,716 % 2.4 6.1 
Institution  Rule of Law index 3,725  0.0 1.0 
Income 
Log of GDP per capital  
(2010 PPP$) 
3,729  9.1 1.2 
Internet 
Log of number of internet users 
per 100 population 
3,604  2.0 2.2 
Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation as a 
share of GDP 
3,245 % 22.7 9.6 
Govt. 
spending 
General government final 
consumption expenditure as a 
share of GDP 
3,261 % 16.0 6.2 
Inflation Annual inflation rate 3,388 % 7.3 26.6 
Notes: The data for all variables, with the exception of Institution, are derived from the World Bank’s World 
Development Database. The Rule of Law index is from the World Governance Indicators dataset.  
 
4.2. Estimation techniques 
Omitted variable bias (OVB) and simultaneity are the major econometric concerns we attempt 
to address. To reduce the magnitude of OVB, country-specific effects and time dummies should 
be included as a natural way to control for the effects of missing or unobserved variables, which 
are potentially correlated with explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2003). As argued by Kiviet (1995), 
including country and time dummies, known as the Least Square Dummies Variable (LSDV), is 
an effective way to handle dynamic panel bias. Taking into account these insights, country-fixed 
effects and time factors are included in all regressions to minimize the potential problem of 
OVB. Note that the time trend and time dummies are two alternatives to control for time 
influence. While the inclusion of time trend detects a consistent influence of the time factor 
overtime; that of year dummies controls for the time influence specific to each year.  
However, controlling for country- and time-fixed effects does not help address the potential 
endogeneity of other regressors (Roodman, 2009b). One effective way to overcome this 
problem is the employment of the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach, which is 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and further developed by Arellano and 
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Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Since their introduction, 
GMM techniques have become increasingly popular in the empirical economic growth 
literature for examining causal relationships from panel data.14 
According to Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Bond, Hoeffler, and 
Temple (2001), the GMM estimators offers several important advantages compared to other 
estimation techniques. First, they are designed for analyzing panel data in which the correlation 
between the lagged dependent variables and the error term may be significant. Second, GMM 
estimators take into account the presence of country-fixed effects. Third, they address the 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation potentially faced by the error term. Finally, they allow 
some regressors to be endogenous, using their own lags as “internal” instruments.  
When employing the GMM procedure, one can choose between two estimators: First 
Differenced-GMM (FD-GMM) and System-GMM (SYS-GMM). The SYS-GMM estimator, 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), is considered an 
important improvement over the FD-GMM estimator, which was proposed by Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen (1988), and developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As demonstrated by 
Soto (2009), the SYS-GMM estimator is superior to the other estimators, including the FD-GMM 
estimator, because of its reduced bias and higher efficiency. Furthermore, the SYS-GMM works 
better than the FD-GMM when the number of entities (such as countries) is small and the 
dependent variable is closer to a random walk (Blundell and Bond, 1998). More specifically, 
Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple (2001) demonstrate that SYS-GMM is better suited than FD-GMM 
for empirical studies of growth. The consistency of the SYS-GMM estimator, however, depends 
heavily on the assumption that its lagged change instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
terms (Roodman, 2009b).15This assumption, however, is unlikely to hold when the lagged 
change, such as that for internet penetration, is influenced by country-fixed effects (Vu, 2019). 
                                                          
14For example, see Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2000), Easterly, Loayza and 
Montiel (1997), Forbes (2000), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Forbes (2000), 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), and Eicher and Schreiber (2010). 
 
15It is critical to the validity of the moment conditions 𝐸[∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1] = 0, where 𝑦 is the dependent variable and 𝑡 ≥ 3. 
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To overcome this vulnerability, country fixed effects are included in all the SYS-GMM 
estimations. 
For a GMM estimation to yield consistent estimates, it has to pass two tests: The Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test and the Hansen test. While the null hypothesis for the Arellano-Bond AR(2) test is of 
the nonexistence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals, that for the Hansen test is of 
the validity of instruments as a group. A GMM estimation is valid only if the p-values obtained 
from these two tests are higher than the 10% threshold.  
5. Estimation results 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Each table contains results from three 
estimators: FE, OLS-FE, and SYS-GMM. Note that the p-values from the AR(2) and Hansen tests 
reported in each table confirm the validity of its GMM estimation. As presented in Section 4, 
the SYS-GMM results can be considered the most reliable for interpreting the findings. 
 
5.1. The Internet-growth link 
The estimations in Table 3 are focused on evaluating the overall effect of the internet on 
worldwide growth. For this purpose, the interaction term L1.Internet*Backward is excluded 
from the regression model. Two main findings stand out from Table 3. First, the coefficients of 
the key variables, including L1.Income, Institution, Investment, Govt. spending, and Inflation, 
which are widely used in the growth literature, take their expected signs and are statistically 
significant. This finding lends support to the soundness of the basic model. Second, the 
coefficient of the variable L1.Internet is positive and robustly significant at the 1% significance 
level in all regressions. Its estimated magnitude of 0.5, reported in Column (4), indicates that, 
for an average country, a 10% increase in internet adoption will raise the growth rate by 0.05% 
points.16 
                                                          
16Czernich et al. (2011) find that raising broadband penetration by 10% points would boost GDP per capita growth 
by 0.9 to 1.5% points. Although this study and our paper examine the effect of two different measures of ICT 
penetration, their results lend support to one another. 
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Table 3: Internet penetration and GDP per capita growth 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth (%) 
Variable 
OLS-FE SYS-GMM 
(1) (2) (3) 
L1.Growth 0.147*** 0.143** 0.021 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
L1.Income -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.226*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
L1.Internet 0.515*** 0.413*** 0.860*** 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) 
Institution 1.526*** 1.591*** 2.12 
  (0.53) (0.53) (2.06) 
Investment 0.062* 0.066* 0.032 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.042) 
Govt. spending -0.214*** -0.153*** -0.824*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.27) 
Inflation -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.007) 
Time trend (Year) 0.019 
 
0.242*** 
  (0.03) 
 
(0.08) 
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time-FE No Yes No 
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 
 GMM tests (p-value) 
AB test of AR(2)     0.118 






Notes: The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. For the GMM estimations, the GMM Instruments are 
the first and second lagged values of the explanatory variables and the IV Instruments include time dummies, 
country dummies, and income group dummies; The count of instruments (lags) used for each Hansen test is 






5.2. The backward advantage and the internet-growth link 
Having evidenced the significant effect of internet use on per capita income growth, w e are 
now focused on the main research question: “do ‘backward’ countries reap greater growth 
gains from internet adoption?” We use the 1990 per capita income (measured in PPP$) to 
define the term backwardness according for which the sample of 163 countries examined in 
this paper are divided into four income quarters. The dummy Backward represents the 
countries belonging to the three lower income quarters. Under this definition, the “backward” 
group comprises 123 countries with an income level below the 75-percentile, while the 
remaining 40 countries in the top income quarter constitute the base group(see Appendix 1 for 
details). It should be noted that using the 1990 income level makes this classification 
straightforward and exogenous to the effect of internet penetration 
 
Table 4 reports results from regressions based on Eq (8). The coefficient on the interaction term 
Backward*L1.Internet, which captures the enhanced effect of the internet on growth in 
“backward” economies, provides a measures of the backwardness advantage. A number of 
valuable findings stand out from Table 4. 
First, the coefficients of the key covariates take their expected signs and are statistically 
significant in most regressions. In particular, the coefficient of L1.Income is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions, which supports the conditional convergence effect, 
which has been found extensively in previous studies. The coefficient on Institution is positive in 
all regressions and significant at the 1% level in regressions (1) and (2), which implies a 
significant link between institutional quality and growth. A possible reason for this coefficient 
being less significant in the GMM estimation is its more effective control for endogeneity.  
Similarly, the coefficient on Investment is positive in all regressions but statistically significant 
only in regressions (1) and (2). On the other hand, the coefficients on Govt_spending and 
Inflation are negative and statistically significant in all regressions, which means these two 
variables have a significant adverse effect on growth.  
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Second, the coefficient on Year (time trend) is positive and significant at the 1% significance 
level in regression (3). Note that, the estimate is dropped in regression (2) because this 
estimation includes time dummies. This finding supports the hypothesis that, on average, 
growth tends to accelerate overtime over the 1996-2016 period. That is, technology progress, 
globalization, and new waves of reforms across countries appeared to have a long-term effect 
on global growth. 
Lastly but most importantly, the coefficients on L1.Internetand its interaction term provide 
valuable insights on the effect of internet on growth. The coefficient on L1.Internet is positive in 
all regression but statistically significant only in regression (1). This coefficient, however, is  not 
significant in regression (2), which controls for time-fixed effects, and in regression (3), which is 
most effective in controlling for endogeneity. Note that the coefficient on L1.Internet captures 
the effect of internet penetration on growth in the base group, which consists of high-income 
countries. This finding suggests that the effect of internet penetration has a positive effect on 
growth in high income nations but the evidence is not robust enough to be statistically 
significant.17On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction term, L1.Internet*Backward, 
is statistically significant in all regressions. This result means that the effect of internet adoption 
on growth in developing countries is significantly larger than in high-income nations. 
  
                                                          
17Several explanations are possible. First, Internet is measured in this paper is based on the number of internet 
users per 100 inhabitants (not broadband users due to the huge amount of zeros in early years in developing 
countries). For developed countries there is certainly some kind of saturation effect as the number of Internet 
users does not grow much after 2005 and the broadband penetration may be a more meaningful measure to 
capture its effect on growth. Second, population aging in developed countries is an apparent problem. As its 
population gets aging, a country’s internet penetration rate increases but its economic performance would suffer. 
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Table 4: Backwardness advantage and the enhanced growth effect of internet 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth (%) 
 
OLS-FE SYS-GMM 
(1) (2) (3) 
L1.Growth 0.147*** 0.143** 0.028 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.04) 
L1.Income -0.088*** -0.081*** -0.236*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.038) 
L1.Internet 0.330** 0.106 0.015 
 
(0.131) (0.161) (0.324) 
L1.Internet*Backward 0.184* 0.257** 0.896** 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.366) 
Institution 1.594*** 1.717*** 1.196 
 
(0.534) (0.534) (2.04) 
Investment 0.060* 0.065* 0.01 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) 
Govt. spending -0.218*** -0.157*** -0.703*** 
 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.244) 
Inflation -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Time trend (Year) 0.035   0.324*** 
 
(0.027)   (0.087) 
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time-FE No Yes No 
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 
R-squared 0.32 0.38 
 P-value of tests 
AB test of AR(2) 
 
 0.173 





Joint significant of Internet and 
its interaction term 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. For the GMM estimations the GMM Instruments are 
the first and second lagged values of the explanatory variables and the IV Instruments include time dummies, 
country dummies, and income group dummies; The count of instruments (lags) used for each Hansen test is 





5.3. The backward advantage and the internet-growth link: a deeper look 
In the previous subsection, we examined the entire “backwardness” group, which consists of 
the three lower income quarters: the lowest (which includes the countries with per capita 
income below the 25-percentile); the lower-middle (from 25-percentile and below the 50-
percentile); and the upper-middle (from 50-percentile and below 75-percentile). We create 
dummy variables for these three quarters to capture their individual effect: Backward1 for the 
lowest income quarter; Backward2 for the lower-middle; and Backward3 for the higher-middle 
In this subsection we look deeper into which lower income quarters tend to reap great growth 
gains from internet adoption. For this purpose we replace the interaction term 
L1.Internet*Backward with three new interaction terms, L1.Internet*Backward1, 
L1.Internet*Backward2, and L1.Internet*Backward3.Table 5 reports the results from 
regressions based on this modified model. 
Similar to what we have found from Table 4 above, the coefficients on the covariates take their 
expected signs and are significant in regressions (1) and (2) while they are less significant in 
regression (3), in which simultaneity is eliminated. At the same time, the coefficient on the time 
trend is positive and significant at the 1% significance level, which confirms the positive effect 
of time on growth, which is associated with technology progress, enhanced global integration, 
and new waves of economic reforms across nations. Furthermore, the coefficient on L1.Internet 
is positive but not significant, while the combined effect of the coefficients on the three 
interaction terms is statistically significant at the 10% level in regression (1) and at the 5% 
significance level in regressions (2) and (3). 
The most important finding from Table 5, however, is that not all the coefficients on the three 
interaction terms are significant although they are all positive. In fact, only the coefficient on 
L1.Internet*Backward3 is significant in all the three regressions. This finding suggests that being 
backward only is not enough to benefit from the backwardness advantage in the information 
age. Reaching a certain level of income, which means a certain level of development, appears 




Table 5: Backwardness advantage and the enhanced growth effect of internet – a deeper look 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth (%) 
Variable OLS-FE SYS-GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
L1.Growth 0.148*** 0.143** 0.01 
 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.042) 
L1.Income -0.088*** -0.081*** -0.256*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.034) 
L1.Internet 0.334** 0.106 0.106 
 
(0.132) (0.168) (0.369) 
L1.Internet* Backward1 0.198 0.276* 0.615 
 (0.141) (0.146) (0.462) 
L1.Internet* Backward2 0.145 0.232* 0.701 
 (0.115) (0.124) (0.499) 
L1.Internet* Backward3 0.214* 0.268** 1.659** 
 
(0.126) (0.123) (0.763) 
Institution 1.566*** 1.700*** 3.373 
 
(0.534) (0.535) (2.128) 
Investment 0.06 0.065* -0.023 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.031) 
Govt. spending -0.218*** -0.157*** -0.652*** 
 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.23) 
Inflation -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.01* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 





Country-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time-FE No Yes No 
N 3,006 3,006 3,006 
R-squared 0.32 0.38  
P-value of tests 
AB test of AR(2)   0.178 
Hansen test of  
overid. restrictions  
  0.707 
(#lag=121) 
Combined effecta 0.097 0.026 0.033 
Notes: The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. For the GMM estimations the GMM Instruments are 
the first and second lagged values of the explanatory variables and the IV Instruments include time dummies, 
country dummies, and income group dummies; The count of instruments (lags) used for each Hansen test is 
reported under its p-value. aUsing Stata command “lincom” for the three interaction terms to test the significance 





5.4 Some theoretical implications 
This section is devoted to further discussing the results with specific emphasis on whether the 
established results confirm the findings of Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. 
(2013) and Niebel (2018) that no statistical evidence is apparent to confirm the scholarly 
position that emerging and developing countries are benefiting more from ICT compared to 
developed countries18. As apparent in the previous sections pertaining to the presentation of 
results, the findings of Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel 
(2018) cannot be confirmed in the present study. In what follows, we clarify why the results in 
this study do not support the results of the previous research, notably, in terms of: sample, 
methodology and theoretical underpinnings underlying catch-up modeling. These distinctive 
features are expanded in the same chronology as highlighted. 
 First, there are differences with respect to the countries in the sample. While Niebel 
(2018) has focused on a panel of 59 countries for the period 1995–2010 and the earlier studies 
by Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013) covered even less countries, this 
study is concerned with a panel of 163 countries from 1996 to 2016. From intuition, sampling 
improvements in terms of space (difference of 104 countries) and time (i.e. 2011 to 2016) can 
partly elicit why the previous findings do not withstand empirical scrutiny. In essence, the 104 
more countries, now covering also some of the least developed countries, can substantially 
weigh on the underlying findings and ICT penetration might have significantly increased 
between 2011 and 2016 in developing countries to elucidate cross-country differences in 
economic development between developed countries and their developing counterparts.  
Second, the ICT measure differs. Previous studies by Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) 
and Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel (2018) use monetary measures of general ICT capital 
(Hardware, Software and Telecommunication Equipment), whereas this study focus on the 
number of internet users per 100 populations. Internet penetration is a much broader measure 
                                                          
18 More specially, Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007: 1992) assert “whereas evidence is provided that developing 
countries have started to benefit from ICT, although its impact is lower, compared to that of developed countries”; 
while Dedrick et al. (2013:111) confirms “there is no significant difference between developed and developing 
countries regarding the effect of IT capital stock on output” 
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which also measures access to knowledge by the whole population and not just ICT capital by 
firms. So our measure also captures knowledge spillovers. This view is supported by the 
previous findings of Dedrick et al. (2013) which show that the productivity effects of general ICT 
capital are moderated by the level of Internet penetration in the respective country.  
 Third, disparities in methodologies are also apparent given that the studies of 
Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel (2018) are largely based 
static models whereas dynamic estimated techniques are taken on board in this study. This 
difference in estimation approach motivates the third distinctive feature which pertains to 
theoretical underpinnings surrounding the modeling of the catch-up process.  
 Fourth, compared to static models, dynamic models are tailored to be more relevant in 
estimating catch-up because a lagged dependent variable is included as an independent 
variable of interest, such that the information criterion used to assess the rate of catch-up and 
corresponding time to full catch-up is contingent on the estimated lagged dependent variable 
(Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). Moreover, as clarified in previous sections of this study, 
modeling catch-up with the GMM estimation technique is consistent with theoretical 
underpinnings underlying the Solow-Swan model, such that, cross-country differences in the 
outcome variables (and hence catch-up) is apparent when there are cross-country differences 
in determinants of the outcome variable which are captured in the conditioning information 
set. While ICT penetration and especially Internet penetration has reached saturation levels in 
developed countries, the fact that developing countries still have a high potential for the 
attendant ICT penetration (Minkoua Nzie, Bidogeza & Ngum, 2018; Ejemeyovwi, J. O., and 
Osabuohien, 2020; Kuada and Mensah, 2020; Tchamyou, 2019), implies that catch-up in 
economic development can be apparent, granting that, information technology is exogenous to 
economic development. Accordingly, there is a growing strand of literature on the importance 
of ICT in socio-economic development in developing countries (Gosavi, 2018; Isszhaku, Abu & 






6. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions  
 “Knowledge is the engine of growth.” To economists and policy makers alike, this statement  
made by Alfred Marshall more than 100 years ago is not only correct but also fundamental and 
strategic. Probably in this spirit, Gerschenkron (1962) postulated that developing countries 
have an advantage over developed nations because they can quickly and less riskily adopt 
knowledge in the forms of technology, methods of production, and management techniques 
that have been developed by the leaders. Since then, a number of studies have provided both 
theoretical models and empirical evidence supporting this backwardness advantage hypothesis. 
At the micro level, Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) provide robust empirical evidence and 
theoretical models to evidence that knowledge acquisition has significant effects on 
productivity improvement and investment in human capital, which all stimulate growth. 
However, empirical studies on the effect of the backwardness advantage on economic growth 
at national level remain scarce.  
This paper set out to assess whether the findings of Niebel (2018) and the earlier studies by 
Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013) withstand empirical scrutiny when 
more countries and contemporary data are taken on board. The findings in as sense run 
counter to Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007) and Dedrick et al. (2013) and in particular  Niebel 
(2018) who concludes that emerging and developing countries are not gaining more from 
investment in ICT than their developed counterparts. The relevance of extending the work by 
Papaioannou and Dimelis (2007), Dedrick et al. (2013) and Niebel (2018) to scholars and policy 
makers has been clarified in the introduction while the “further discussion of results” section in 
the light of difference in sample, methodology and theoretical underpinnings surrounding 
catch-up modeling.  
The digital revolution’s impact on economic growth has been found significant across countries 
and sectors. However, the importance of the channels through which this impact is transmitted 
may vary by country depending on their level of development. On the one hand, it is expected 
that developed countries are in a better position to benefit from embracing the digital 
transformation, especially in the adoption of the technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), 
robotics, and Internet of things (IoT)that require more advanced infrastructure and human 
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capital. On the other hand, developing countries appear to reap greater gains from the internet 
and its related technologies such as social media and platform/sharing economy thanks to the 
backwardness advantage, especially in learning, innovation, marketing, and job search. The 
findings from this paper confirm these assessments. 
The additional effect of digital technologies on economic growth in lower-income countries via 
the channel of learning and technology acquisition suggests that this channel should be a 
primary focus of digital transformation strategies, especially in capital investment plans and 
regulatory reform efforts in developing countries. More specifically, governments in developing 
countries should effectively take on the following top policy priorities. The first priority is to 
promote investments in digital infrastructure and strengthening cyber security, especially 
broadband, fiber, and cloud computing. For lower-income countries, this investment is most 
likely more urgent and efficient than investing in 5G mobile technology because without a good 
fiber backbone, there are not many benefits from 5G.19 Second, the government should 
strongly encourage firms and people to engage in technology acquisition, knowledge diffusion, 
and learning. Third, the less developed sectors such as agriculture, tourism, as well as small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), which can gain most from their backwardness advantage, should 
receive special support from the government in their digital learning and transformation 
endeavors. 
After discussing the practical contributions of the study, it is worthwhile to clarify that this 
study is positioned on assessing theoretical underpinnings surrounding the thesis that catch-up 
in economic development is contingent on cross-country differences in technology and other 
determinants of economic development. Accordingly, research can either be positioned on 
confirming an existing theoretical exposition or providing theory-building insights. The modest 
contribution of this research to scholarship is in the former framework. Hence, no theoretical 
contributions are consistent with the motivation and purpose of the study.  
                                                          
19 The 5G mobile technology is expected be superior to its predecessors: (i) enhanced mobile broadband 
experience with peak speeds of up to 20Gbps (20-fold increase over 4G); (ii) ability to support large-scale M2M 
communication; and (iii) ultra-reliability and low latency that support drones and driverless cars. It is obvious that a 
less developing country would benefit less from 5G if it is still behind too far in embracing 4G, especially for 
learning and technology acquisition.  
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On the caveats of the study, it is important to note that while the internet is established to 
contribute to the economic growth catch-up process, internet is not solely responsible for the 
catch-up because the modeling exercise is within the framework of conditional beta 
convergence. Accordingly, while all adopted variables in the conditioning information set 
contribute towards the catch-up, internet is one of the most significant factors. Moreover, in 
the real world, the internet and growth do not interact in isolation but require other 
macroeconomic factors, which justified the need for a conditional convergence modeling 
approach. Other limitations of the study pertain to inter alia, the fact that: (i) causality cannot 
be exhaustively established with the adopted empirical strategies and (ii) owing to constraints 
in data availability at the time of the study, more updated measures of information technology 
could not be taken on board. 
 In the light of the above caveats, future research can enhance the established findings 
by assessing how the findings are relevant within country-specific frameworks in order to 
engender more country-specific implications. Moreover, as more data become available, 
smartphones which entail the mobile phone, the internet connection and other apparent 
information technology externalities, could be used as a more appropriate and holistic measure 
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Appendix 1: The list of countries and backwardness advantage by definition 





income in 1990 
(PPP$) 
 









Developed countries    
1. Luxembourg 57,618 No No 
2. Switzerland 48,182 No No 
3. Norway 42,814 No No 
4. United States 37,062 No No 
5. Denmark 33,786 No No 
6. Netherlands 32,090 No No 
7. Austria 31,342 No No 
8. Canada 31,300 No No 
9. Germany 31,287 No No 
10. Italy 31,142 No No 
11. Sweden 30,934 No No 
12. Belgium 30,648 No No 
13. Japan 30,582 No No 
14. France 29,515 No No 
15. Finland 28,906 No No 
16. Australia 28,658 No No 
17. United Kingdom 26,828 No No 
18. Spain 23,759 No No 
19. New Zealand 23,671 No No 
20. Ireland 21,453 No No 
21. Greece 20,686 No No 
22. Israel 20,520 No No 
23. Portugal 20,167 No No 
Developing countries 
24. United Arab Emirates 110,433 Yes No 
25. Brunei Darussalam 84,672 Yes No 
26. Saudi Arabia 42,457 Yes No 
27. Bermuda 40,553 Yes No 
28. Macao SAR, China 40,365 Yes No 
29. Bahrain 35,113 Yes No 
30. Oman 35,042 Yes No 
46 
 
31. Singapore 34,345 Yes No 
32. Bahamas, The 30,992 Yes No 
33. Hong Kong SAR, China 26,974 Yes No 
34. Cyprus 23,301 Yes No 
35. Puerto Rico 22,227 Yes No 
36. Russian Federation 20,639 Yes No 
37. Czech Republic 20,023 Yes No 
38. Gabon 19,501 Yes No 
39. Antigua and Barbuda 16,381 Yes No 
40. Malta 16,176 Yes No 
41. Venezuela, RB 14,451 Yes Yes 
42. Barbados 14,434 Yes Yes 
43. St. Kitts and Nevis 14,326 Yes Yes 
44. Seychelles 14,217 Yes Yes 
45. Mexico 13,070 Yes Yes 
46. Kazakhstan 13,050 Yes Yes 
47. Trinidad and Tobago 12,255 Yes Yes 
48. Korea, Rep. 11,633 Yes Yes 
49. Iraq 11,522 Yes Yes 
50. Romania 11,422 Yes Yes 
51. Turkey 11,400 Yes Yes 
52. Iran, Islamic Rep. 11,393 Yes Yes 
53. Argentina 10,816 Yes Yes 
54. Malaysia 10,552 Yes Yes 
55. Suriname 10,545 Yes Yes 
56. Ukraine 10,464 Yes Yes 
57. Brazil 10,345 Yes Yes 
58. Poland 10,277 Yes Yes 
59. Algeria 10,237 Yes Yes 
60. Uruguay 9,841 Yes Yes 
61. St. Lucia 9,831 Yes Yes 
62. South Africa 9,696 Yes Yes 
63. Macedonia, FYR 9,633 Yes Yes 
64. Bulgaria 9,297 Yes Yes 
65. Chile 8,992 Yes Yes 
66. Azerbaijan 8,513 Yes Yes 
67. Belarus 8,354 Yes Yes 
68. Turkmenistan 8,317 Yes Yes 
69. Botswana 8,110 Yes Yes 
70. Georgia 8,007 Yes Yes 
71. Lebanon 7,858 Yes Yes 
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72. Panama 7,855 Yes Yes 
73. Costa Rica 7,787 Yes Yes 
74. Colombia 7,534 Yes Yes 
75. Ecuador 7,472 Yes Yes 
76. Mauritius 7,387 Yes Yes 
77. Jamaica 7,286 Yes Yes 
78. Grenada 7,242 Yes Yes 
79. Dominica 6,730 Yes Yes 
80. Thailand 6,650 Yes Yes 
81. Jordan 6,283 Yes Yes 
82. Paraguay 6,036 Yes Yes 
83. Egypt, Arab Rep. 5,909 Yes Yes 
84. Fiji 5,891 Yes Yes 
85. Namibia 5,719 Yes Yes 
86. Tunisia 5,615 Yes Yes 
87. St. Vincent & Grenadines 5,576 Yes Yes 
88. Dominican Republic 5,477 Yes Yes 
89. Eswatini 5,378 Yes Yes 
90. Peru 5,313 Yes Yes 
91. Belize 5,166 Yes Yes 
92. Congo, Rep. 5,140 Yes Yes 
93. Mongolia 5,123 Yes Yes 
94. Guatemala 5,101 Yes Yes 
95. Albania 4,723 Yes Yes 
96. Indonesia 4,625 Yes Yes 
97. El Salvador 4,545 Yes Yes 
98. Philippines 4,010 Yes Yes 
99. Morocco 3,912 Yes Yes 
100. Armenia 3,742 Yes Yes 
101. Bolivia 3,707 Yes Yes 
102. Samoa 3,649 Yes Yes 
103. Tajikistan 3,645 Yes Yes 
104. Sri Lanka 3,612 Yes Yes 
105. Tonga 3,574 Yes Yes 
106. Kyrgyz Republic 3,475 Yes Yes 
107. Angola 3,431 Yes Yes 
108. Yemen, Rep. 3,327 Yes Yes 
109. Cote d'Ivoire 3,194 Yes Yes 
110. Honduras 3,172 Yes Yes 
111. Uzbekistan 3,071 Yes Yes 
112. Pakistan 3,055 Yes Yes 
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113. Nigeria 3,042 Yes Yes 
114. Cameroon 3,020 Yes Yes 
115. Nicaragua 3,004 Yes Yes 
116. Marshall Islands 2,908 Yes Yes 
117. Guyana 2,843 Yes Yes 
118. Mauritania 2,807 Yes Yes 
119. Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 2,721 Yes Yes 
120. Zimbabwe 2,606 Yes Yes 
121. Vanuatu 2,549 Yes Yes 
122. Kenya 2,380 Yes Yes 
123. Papua New Guinea 2,374 Yes Yes 
124. Tuvalu 2,354 Yes Yes 
125. Zambia 2,342 Yes Yes 
126. Bhutan 2,325 Yes Yes 
127. Kiribati 1,961 Yes Yes 
128. Ghana 1,920 Yes Yes 
129. Solomon Islands 1,883 Yes Yes 
130. Senegal 1,845 Yes Yes 
131. India 1,755 Yes Yes 
132. Sudan 1,743 Yes Yes 
133. Lao PDR 1,708 Yes Yes 
134. Cabo Verde 1,657 Yes Yes 
135. Madagascar 1,653 Yes Yes 
136. Comoros 1,600 Yes Yes 
137. Guinea-Bissau 1,574 Yes Yes 
138. China 1,526 Yes Yes 
139. Gambia, The 1,506 Yes Yes 
140. Tanzania 1,473 Yes Yes 
141. Benin 1,463 Yes Yes 
142. Vietnam 1,453 Yes Yes 
143. Guinea 1,412 Yes Yes 
144. Congo, Dem. Rep. 1,387 Yes Yes 
145. Lesotho 1,379 Yes Yes 
146. Togo 1,350 Yes Yes 
147. Bangladesh 1,288 Yes Yes 
148. Mali 1,272 Yes Yes 
149. Sierra Leone 1,251 Yes Yes 
150. Nepal 1,198 Yes Yes 
151. Chad 1,110 Yes Yes 
152. Burundi 1,087 Yes Yes 
153. Equatorial Guinea 1,000 Yes Yes 
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154. Central African Republic 925 Yes Yes 
155. Niger 895 Yes Yes 
156. Liberia 875 Yes Yes 
157. Rwanda 873 Yes Yes 
158. Burkina Faso 844 Yes Yes 
159. Uganda 769 Yes Yes 
160. Malawi 744 Yes Yes 
161. Myanmar 743 Yes Yes 
162. Ethiopia 652 Yes Yes 
163. Mozambique 379 Yes Yes 
 
 
 
